In a signaling game between a receiver and senders, prejudice occurs if senders are pre-judged based on an index such as race without reference to their qualifying signals. This paper investigates what makes the receiver ignore senders' informative signals in favor of the uninformative index. Prejudice arises when competition between senders erodes their signaling incentive and reduces the quality of signaling significantly. To minimize the decrease in quality, the receiver may pre-screen the senders using the index, removing the impact of competition. We advocate policies that enhance the quality of signals to ensure the effectiveness of competitive signaling systems. JEL Classification Numbers: J71, J78, D82, K31
Introduction
Prejudice is "a preconceived judgment or opinion, an adverse opinion or learning formed without just grounds or before sufficient knowledge" (Merriam Webster dictionary). Hence, prejudice implies decision-making without all relevant information. Typically, this requires a situation in which the relevant information is private and not readily available. Signaling theory predicts that, in such a situation, a person (a sender) who has valuable, private information would have an incentive to reveal the hidden information through an investment in signaling methods. What has not received much attention, however, is that successful signaling also requires the receiver of the information to have an incentive to utilize the signaled information. Although all existing signaling models assume that the receiver always fully utilizes the signaled information, the existence of prejudice implies that this may not be the case in reality.
In this context, this paper develops a model of prejudice as an outcome of failed signaling not because of a lack of signaling incentives by the sender, but because of a lack of interest by the receiver in utilizing signals. This paper investigates the conditions under which the receiver becomes less interested in fully utilizing the information (henceforth, full information). We also offer new insights about the potential inefficiency of signaling under full information and the implications of related policies and their effectiveness.
The model builds on a simple signaling game between a receiver and two senders. The senders' quality is private information, whereas the two senders are easily distinguishable by an irrelevant, but observable, characteristic, such as race, gender, or physical beauty, which is termed an index, following Spence (1973) . The senders can signal their hidden quality to the receiver by investing in an effort.
To understand the model, for example, suppose that two candidates (senders), a male and a female, are being interviewed for a job. In order to discover whether they are qualified, the recruiter must review their application files thoroughly and pay attention to the details of their responses to questions while being interviewed. That is, the recruiter needs to process their signals. However, instead of acquiring all of the information and signals from each candidate for their decision, the recruiter may decide to pay more attention to the male candidate's information and skim through the female candidate's information. In this case, prejudice occurs, not because gender was a factor in decision, but because some useful information about female candidate's qualification was intentionally ignored in favor of gender-based screening. Whether the female candidate was truly qualified, or even more qualified than the male candidate, would never be known.
We distinguish prejudice from discrimination in that prejudice refers to differentiating the two candidates by gender before the recruiter gets to know anything about them (even though more relevant information is available), whereas discrimination refers to treating them differently by gender after the recruiter have investigated all of the available information about them.
Why would the recruiter want to rely on uninformative gender (index) first instead of acquiring full information? To the receiver, prejudice is preferable only if the index is more effective in identifying high quality candidates than full information. Then, when and why is full information less efficient than prejudice? In our benchmark case, considering a typical model of signaling in which each type of sender independently invests in signals, we show that such a framework is inadequate to explain prejudice. In general, it is never optimal for the receiver to discard any valuable information from the senders in favor of less informative index in that framework.
However, the entire dynamics of the signaling game change if there is a shortage of return from successful signaling, which we consider in Section 4. In the example above, the shortage occurs if there is only one position available for the two candidates. Then, there is a chance that senders' signaling efforts will be wasted even without prejudice, because there is insufficient room for all of the qualified senders. As one sender's chance of being chosen depends on whether the other sender has a qualifying signal, two senders' signaling decisions become interdependent. Also, since receiving a return from signaling effort becomes uncertain, senders' incentive to signal decreases. Even fair competition under full information can be as discouraging as prejudice. The only difference is that under prejudice, the effort is wasted if they do not possess the favorable characteristic, whereas under competition for limited positions, the effort is to no avail if the sender does not win the competition. As the senders' signaling efforts decrease, the value of full information to the receiver diminishes.
Noisy and imperfect signals reduce the value further. For example, if all senders have equally qualifying signals (pooling), or if their signals are too similar to differentiate their hidden qualities, the receiver would have to rely on the index when making a selection. We call such an index-based decision comparative discrimina-tion to distinguish it from prejudice. 1 The possibility of comparative discrimination decreases the senders' signaling incentives and thus reduces the value of signals to the receiver. Such a chain reaction from strategic interactions between senders as well as with the receiver can easily destroy the value of competitive signaling under full information. When the receiver expects that quality of information under full signaling deteriorates substantially, the receiver chooses prejudice. The main role of prejudice is to pre-screen the senders in order to decrease the number of senders to consider and have less information to process. Since the selection is independent of senders' effort choices, it lessens the impact of value-destroying competition for the insufficient return between the senders. Thus, when overheated competition between the senders lessens their signaling incentives, prejudice becomes an alternative in order to moderate the negative impact of competition.
The efficiency of competitive signaling comes from fairly distributing signaling incentives among the senders. The distribution is fair in the sense that ex ante identical senders make symmetric efforts, although the efforts can be asymmetric if the senders are not identical. In contrast, prejudice always results in the most biased selection that favors one of them. Anticipating this, even ex ante identical senders will have asymmetric efforts. Prejudice is inefficient if a fair distribution of incentives creates an overall greater value of signaling than a biased distribution under prejudice.
However, competitive signaling can be as inefficient as prejudice, if its "fair" distribution of incentives is not so different from the distribution under prejudice. This occurs if signals are more correlated with race or gender than with the senders' quality. For example, if signaling is prohibitively costly for a minority, there is no essential difference between competitive signaling and prejudice. In either system, a minority with high quality will never have sufficient incentive to signal, due either to prejudice or to economic hardship. Antonovics and Backes (2013) report that, if the admission standard in the University of California system had not changed after the affirmative action ban, the rate of under-representation would have been twice as great under the previous system that emphasized grades and test scores. This raises doubts as to whether competitive signals like test scores are more correlated with the quality of the senders than with their race.
In order to maintain the efficiency of full signaling under competition, we em- 1 Comparative discrimination is different from statistical discrimination. For detailed explanation on the differences, see Section 4.2.1.
phasize the importance of policies that make the signals closely correlated with the hidden quality but not with the senders' current economic status, race, or gender. For instance, the Head Start program or the No Child Left Behind policy may help to reduce the racial gap due to an unfavorable signaling environment for minorities. If these policies can make signaling functions from both races more homogenous independently of their economic status, any difference in their signaling outcomes could be attributed to a difference in the hidden quality. In that case, a competition-oriented admission policy would work efficiently. As Aristotle argued, treating "like cases alike" is required for equality and "identical treatment is not equal treatment,[..] if individuals are not similarly situated." 2 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the contributions of this paper to the literature. Section 3 presents our basic framework of a costly process to decipher signaled information and a benchmark case when there is no competition between senders. In Section 4, we introduce a strategic/interactive signaling model with a possible shortage of the return from signaling efforts. Section 5 derives equilibrium. In Section 6, we discuss the policy implications of the results. In Section 7, we present our conclusions.
Contributions to the Literature
The novelty of this paper is its original model of prejudice that differentiates prejudice from discrimination. The model highlights the role of a shortage of the return from signaling in leading to prejudice in equilibrium. We advocate the importance of enhancing the quality of signals under competition because prejudice arises as a result of inefficient competitive signaling.
There is an abundance of theoretical literature that is devoted to an explanation of discrimination. While some theories, such as in Becker, (1957) describe it as a matter of preference, many others spurred by the seminal papers of Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) explain it as a result of statistical discrimination. Fang and Moro (2011) provide an excellent survey of the literature that deals with statistical discrimination.
In the statistical discrimination literature, Coate and Loury (1993), Moro and Norman (2004) , and Mialon and Yoo (2014) are closely related to the present paper. 3 There are many other studies with interesting approaches to explain discrimination, although Coate and Loury (1993) explain statistical discrimination as a result of coordination failure between players in a self-fulfilling equilibrium and emphasize the importance of affirmative action in shaping the players' beliefs about non-discriminatory equilibrium. Moro and Norman (2004) are the first to explicitly model discrimination as a "relative" advantage that induces a greater payoff for one group at the expense of the other. In their general equilibrium model, the production technology requires two complementary inputs. The marginal product of each input adjusts accordingly if relatively too many workers of the population invest in the skills for one. Thus, discrimination is an outcome of two groups specializing in different tasks. The present paper and Mialon and Yoo (2014) pioneer in modeling interdependent signaling decisions of senders. Mialon and Yoo (2014) show that employers prefer a discriminatory outcome because it reduces the overall risks of hiring. They show how employers can actively influence the discriminatory outcome and that discrimination is thus likely to be persistent.
In contrast, the present paper models prejudice, a more fundamentally inefficient discrimination of senders, as a purposeful act of ignoring potentially valuable information about senders in favor of a pre-judgment based on the uninformative index. It is a shortage of the return from signaling that motivates prejudice. The shortage intensifies competition and deteriorates the efficiency of competitive signaling. Thus, prejudice is more likely to occur when competition is intense.
Although the statistical discrimination literature explains how ex ante identical senders can be discriminated in equilibrium, the present paper finds that such discrimination is unlikely to occur if more effective discrimination is possible by means of prejudice. Since prejudice works as a most effective way of discriminating senders, the receiver chooses full information only if fair distribution of incentives is desirable. Thus, the receiver would never choose full information to discriminate ex ante identical senders. they are not closely related to this paper. For example, Mailath et al (2000) model discrimination as an outcome of search frictions, Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008) discuss the relationship between integration and discrimination, and Klumpp and Su (2013a) show how self-fulfilling beliefs about a low variance in female human capital distribution induce a low representation of female workers in high-end jobs. Blume (2005) considers a dynamic model of statistical discrimination to explain how a discriminatory equilibrium is selected instead of a non-discriminatory one. He explains that a discriminatory equilibrium may occur as a result of firms' learning about worker investment decisions.
The Costly Process of Extracting Information from Signals
Consider a game that involves a receiver and two senders. 4 Each sender is characterized by his/her quality, high () or low (), and an index  = 1 2. Although the quality is the private information of senders,  is observable to the receiver  at no cost. The two senders differ in . We assume that  is not subject to choice.  is irrelevant in that 's payoff depends only on the quality,  =  , of the sender and not . The payoff from selecting a −type of sender is   0 whereas the payoff from selecting a −type of sender is zero. Let   0 be the probability that each sender has  quality. When a sender makes an effort   , the sender receives    0 if selected, whereas the payoff for all other cases are normalized to zero. 5 Signaling is costly for senders. Let   ∈ [0 ∞) be the cost of choosing   for a −type of sender,  = 1 1 2 2. This cost is also private information. The receiver  has information only about the cost distribution of each type. Let   and   be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) and the probability distribution function (pdf) of type , respectively, on the support [0 ∞). We assume that   is twice-differentiable and that the ratio of the two pdfs for type  = 1 2,
, satisfies the property of
. Signals are intrinsically noisy. However, the MLRP ensures that the signals are more likely to be correct than not in predicting an −type. The MLRP implies that   () first order stochastically dominates (FOSD)   (). Thus, on average, it is more costly for an −type to signal than it is for an −type, ceteris paribus.
The receiver  must incur a cost of   0 to extract information from signals 4 The model considers two senders only for simplicity. This game is equivalent to one in which (i) there are many identical receivers and two types () of a continuum of senders of mass 1 on an interval of [0 ] for   , and (ii) each receiver is randomly matched to the senders from each type. Introducing   2 possible types of  makes the signaling decision of each type senders depend on that of the remaining  − 1 types. Except for the increased dimension of strategic interactions, the same qualitative results are expected to hold for   2 possible types of . 5 We assume that    0 is given exogenously for several reasons. First, in many cases, there is prejudice in a non-market situation and the payoff   from acquiring the scarce position is often a non-market price. For example, in the case of college admissions, there is no flexible market price. Second, even if the payoff of competitive signaling is determined in the market, the outcomes under prejudice are not determined by the market. For example, if   represents a wage differential resulted from prejudice, it cannot be a completely market-determined price because, by definition, a prejudiced group's wage is not a competitive, market-clearing wage.
whereas the index  is costlessly observable. 6 In some cases,  may wish to first make a decision based on the observed  only. In that case,  observes signals only from the selected type . In the benchmark case below, we first examine the role of the cost  in determining prejudice in a model without competition between two types of . Then, in Section 4, we introduce a shortage of returns from signaling that results in an interaction between the senders. Throughout the paper, regardless of whether or not there is an interaction between the senders, the timing of the game between the receiver and the senders is as follows. At stage 0, nature chooses type  and quality  for each sender. At stage 1, each sender determines whether to make a signaling effort   or not. At stage 2, the receiver  observes the index  of each sender and decides whether to make a decision based on the index () first or to pursue full information from the signaling () of each sender. If  is chosen, at stage 3,  observes all senders' choice of effort. If  is chosen instead,  selects type  with some probability, and only the selected sender's signals can be observed. After  or , how the signals are used for a decision differs depending on whether or not the senders are competing.
Benchmark
For this benchmark case, we assume that there are unlimited positions as in the statistical discrimination literature. Thus, there is no need for competition between the senders, which makes each sender of type  signal independently. This feature allows us to identify the effect of competition as we introduce limited positions in the next section.
Given unlimited positions, as long as the signals are valuable,  is willing to hire as many senders as possible upon observing the qualifying signal   for all . Let e   ∈ [0 1] be the probability that the receiver chooses  and e   ∈ [0 1] be the probability of observing type  0  signal if  is chosen. Since e   and e   are chosen to reflect how much  values the signals in equilibrium, we assume that, if a sender under consideration at stage 3 has a signal   , the sender is selected and receives   , or nothing. 7 Then, a sender of type  decides to invest in signaling effort (  ) if
Thus,  type makes a signaling effort with a probability of   =   ( e   ). For given   and   , the receiver's payoffs from  and  are () = e   − , and () = e   ( e   − ), respectively, where
for  = 1 2. Thus, as long as ()  0 ⇔ e    ,  prefers  and fully utilizes the signals. e   shows the value of signals from type . If  e    e    0, a higher incentive e   induces a higher signaling effort   , and increases 's incentive to utilize signals.
where
from (3). Thus, e   is concave and maximized at   . Assumption 1 ensures that  is not so high that, at least in some cases, it is worthwhile to use all of signaled information.
To ensure that all signaling efforts are intrinsically valuable to the receiver, we also assume that   is high enough to satisfy the following condition. 7 This is a behavioral assumption that we make in order to simplify the analysis. However, even without this assumption, the same behavior is expected to arise in equilibrium. Given the MLRP, any observed   is more likely from an −type than from an −type and thus,   is informative. Then, for a given , using   improves  0  payoff. If   will not be used for selection, it is not necessary to acquire all signals in the first place. Note that acquiring   is costly.  must incur   0 to reach the information of   even if it is not used, whereas the cost  can be avoided if  acquires only the information to be used. Thus, the receiver strictly prefers to reduce the set of information to process rather than not use   . This implies that the receiver would never want to waste   once the information has been obtained by costly efforts. Our assumption simply reflects the nature of predicted equilibrium behavior of  who wants to prioritize the decision of   in determining the value of   . 
 0 Then, prejudice means ignoring intrinsically valuable information. As we intend to explain prejudice as a decision to not pursue potentially valuable information, we require this property of Assumption 2.
8 Lemma 1 summarizes the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria (PBE) in this benchmark case.
Lemma 1 If e   is not too low, the unique equilibrium is that the receiver acquires all of the signaled information ( e   = 1).
Proof. Proofs are provided in the Appendix. As long as the senders expect that e   is not too low, there is sufficient signaling, and no information is wasted ( e   = 1). However, if senders make no effort at all as a result of a self-fulfilling belief about a very low e   ,  will not acquire any signaling information as it would be worthless. In particular, if f  1 = 1  f  2 = 0, for instance, the equilibrium outcome is discriminatory against type 2. This results in Lemma 1 resembles statistical discrimination in the literature.
However, like statistical discrimination models, this model does not explain prejudice. It does not explain why one group should expect a particularly lower e   than the other. Prejudice (like discrimination) is always a relative concept. Offering a type 1 sender an opportunity to prove his qualification becomes prejudice because the same opportunity is not available to a type 2 sender for no proper reason. That is, prejudice is  0 s choice for an asymmetric distribution of the opportunities between the two types of senders. This benchmark framework is inadequate to explain prejudice, because the framework treats a decision for one type in isolation from a decision for the other. In the next section, we build a model in which the receiver considers both types simultaneously in comparison.
Model of Strategic Signaling
For , the value of senders' signals depends on the need. Let  be the parameter that incorporates the need for signaled information. Roughly speaking,  represents
 0, and a higher incentive to signal e      lowers the value of signals. Then,  is not always better off with greater signaling efforts. In this case, ignoring information is not necessarily inefficient because signaling itself is ineffective and cannot be considered to be prejudice. the likelihood of an available return from successful signaling for senders, or the available positions that  needs to fill with  quality senders. Given that we have two candidates, we assume that  ≤ 2. If  = 2,  is willing to hire all senders as long as they are qualified and, thus, there is no competition between the senders. However, when   2,  needs to compare two senders to select the best candidate. To be selected, a sender must have not only a qualifying signal, but also a better signal than the competitor's. Thus, senders' signaling decisions become interdependent. Below, we show that as  declines, the competition between senders intensifies and prejudice is more likely to occur.
In this paper, prejudice differs from discrimination in the level of information that  has, although in both situations,  refers to the index  in selecting senders. There is prejudice when  decides to refuse an opportunity to learn more about the quality of senders of one type, while being receptive to the information from senders of the other type. Discrimination, on the other hand, is treating senders of two types differently after acquiring all available information about them.
Let  denote the probability that  chooses  and acquires all of the signals from all  = 1 2 in this new game of strategic signaling. Prejudice requires first that  chooses  ( = 0). In that case,  also must decide what fraction of the acquired information should be from each . Suppose that  acquires the information from types 1 and 2 with probabilities b
Prejudice occurs when  = 0 and b  1 6 = b  2 .  may need to use  in selection even after acquiring all of the signaling information ( = 1). If both senders have qualifying signals,(  ,  ), given that   2, the receiver will have to use  to choose between the two qualified candidates to fit . Let
, respectively) be the probability that type 1 (2) sender is selected in this case. When b  1  12 we say that there is comparative discrimination in favor of type 1. Comparative discrimination occurs when  = 1 and b
If  is chosen and both senders have   ,  chooses type  with a b   probability at stage 3. If only one of them has   ,  selects the sender with   with a probability of  0 = min{ 1},  0 ≤ 1. If no sender has a qualifying signal, no one is selected. If  chooses  instead,  selects type  with a probability of b   . Only senders with qualifying signals are selected for the position. 9 For the same reason explained in Footnote 5, we make this behavioral assumption to simplify
Sender's problem
Let Ψ 2 be the probability that a type 2 sender invests in signaling. Then, for given , b   and b   , a type 1 sender decides to make an effort to signal if and only if
Similarly, a type 2 sender decides to choose   if and only if
Then, a type  sender makes a signaling effort with   probability, where
shows how the competition between the two senders affects each sender's best response function. From (1), when senders choose signaling efforts independently, the cut-off for signaling incentive was e
, and  0 ≤ 1, we find that b   ≤ e   always, with a strict inequality for at least one  if   2. Therefore, other things being equal, the senders' incentive to signal is lower for all  in interactive signaling.
Proposition 1 (Strategic effect of competitive signaling) Other things being equal, if   2, interaction between two senders reduces their incentives to signal.
When   2, one sender's signaling effort imposes a negative externality on the other sender. For a type 1 sender with a signal, the selection is guaranteed if type 2 does not signal. However, if type 2 does, the return from signaling is available only with b  1 ≤ 1 probability. As  declines, it becomes more difficult to expect a return from their signaling effort (i.e., a lower   ). Thus, senders' incentive to signal decreases. If  is too small, no signaling would be worthwhile. To avoid such a case, we assume that  has a lower bound ,  ∈ (, 2]. 10 the analysis. 10 Let  be the level of  at which   =   , where
and the signal is too costly for  to use. Thus, we assume that  is greater than this level.
On the other hand, (5) shows that the interaction occurs only if
sender's best response becomes independent of the other, eliminating the effect of strategic interaction. This implies that one of the most important roles of prejudice is to remove the impact of interaction and competition between the two types. Thus, when the interaction between two types lowers the value of signaling significantly,  has a greater incentive to choose  and to remove the impact of interaction. We discuss this issue in detail in Section 5.2.
Receiver's problem 4.2.1 Optimal Comparative Discrimination
First, consider 's decision on the optimal   when  is chosen and  observes (  ,  ) from both types of senders. Upon observing (  ,  ),  favors a type 1 sender if and only if
. This condition holds iff
is the ratio of the probabilities that the two  types signal,  =  . Then, the optimal   is characterized as follows.
where  max = min{1 }. This shows that  sets the optimal   so as to minimize prediction errors. The
increases as the signaling function becomes noisier and thus the size of prediction error for type 1 increases. Thus, if
, it implies that type 2 has a greater prediction error, given the observation that the two types had equally qualifying efforts. Thus, the optimal  is to favor type 1 with a lower prediction error,   =  max .
Comparative discrimination differs from statistical discrimination in several aspects. First, comparative discrimination requires competing senders who are compared in their "relative" strength, whereas in determining statistical discrimination, senders are not compared. Second, comparative discrimination is required only when the senders have equally qualifying signals, whereas statistical discrimination does not require such a condition. When senders are in competition, since a sender with a relatively stronger signal has an advantage, there is no need to use the index to discriminate unless the senders' signals are not differentiable. On the other hand, in the case of statistical discrimination, what gives rise to discrimination is self-fulfilling beliefs about each sender's qualification, instead of a comparison based on signals.
At stage 2, the receiver 's expected payoff from acquiring all the information is
where e   is defined in (2),
, and
. (7) shows how competition affects the value of signals for . Without competition, () = e   − . Now, the value of a signal from type 1 e  1 is weighted by  1 which depends on type 2's signaling effort Ψ 2 . The weight  1 decreases if type 2's signaling Ψ 2 increases, and vice versa.
Optimal Level of Prejudice
The receiver's payoff from  is
From (8), for a given , () is merely a convex combination of signaling values from the two senders, e  1 and e  2 . The weight of the signaling from type 1 (type 2, respectively) is  ((1 − ) ).  optimizes the weight considering whether type 1 is expected to generate a greater signaling value than type 2. If  expects that e  1  e  2 , it is best to favor type 1,   =  max , and vice versa. Thus, the optimal   is characterized as follows.
where  max = min{1 
Equilibrium

Comparative Discrimination
To understand how the equilibrium  is determined under full information, , suppose that signaling is much easier for type 1 for any given b , i.e., Φ 1 (b )  Φ 2 (b ). In this situation, if (  ,  ) is observed after ,  rationally infers that the type 2 sender is more likely to have  quality given that signaling was more difficult for type 2 to do. Thus,  favors type 2 to minimize the prediction error. Expecting this, senders adjust their signaling incentives accordingly. Expecting a favorable treatment (a low Eeckhoudt and Gollier [1995] ). That is, the quality of signals deteriorates as it becomes easier to signal. As a result,
decreases, which reduces 's incentive to favor type 2. Proposition 2 describes the equilibrium .
Proposition 2 Suppose there exists a 
and  *  ∈ [0 1]. Then, in equilibrium, if  acquires all of the signaled information and (  ,  ) is observed, the optimal comparative discrimination is  * . If such a  * does not exist, the equilibrium  is  min or  max .
Thus, in general, optimal comparative discrimination is discriminatory. In particular, Proposition 2 implies that, if
Then, it must be that   1 − . Therefore, the optimal  is set to counterbalance the effect of unequal signaling conditions for the two senders.
Suppose that it is particularly difficult for minority students to pursue higher education because of the high costs and that many of them are discouraged by the large income disparity between minority and non-minority groups. Corollary 1 implies that, in this case, if both a minority student and a non-minority student have the same standardized test scores, it is optimal for college admission offices to favor the minority student, as the probability that the student has  quality is higher than that of the non-minority student. However, if the senders are ex ante identical, the optimal  is to treat the two types equally. Since comparative discrimination counter-balances the effect of initial signaling conditions for each sender, it reduces discriminatory outcomes in equilibrium.
Prejudice
Under the expectation of  = 0, b
As long as a sender  is selected in the first round (with a  or (1 − ) probability), the return from signaling is guaranteed. Since  is independent of senders' signaling decisions, their only objective is to optimize their own signaling efforts independently for a given  or (1 − ).
. For the rest of our analysis, we assume that type 1 is favored if prejudice occurs,  * =  max , without loss of generality.
Equilibrium
At stage 2, the receiver's expected payoffs are
and   and   are given in (6) and (9).
The term   e   shows the net gains in type 's signal from switching to full information () if separating occurs (i.e., type  chooses   but the other type − does not), whereas  3 shows the net gains from  when pooling occurs (i.e., both types choose   ). To understand equilibrium conditions, suppose  expects e  1 ≥ e  2 and thus plans to implement   =  max if  is chosen. This results in ( 0 −  max ) = 0, and  1 = 0, which implies that  never gains more from type 1's signaling by switching from  to . What matters to  is how much he gains from offering a type 2 sender more opportunity to signal,  2 and  3 . The extra gain from type 2's signal is not large enough if
( 1 1 ) Thus, if  2 e  2 +  3 is very small, prejudice occurs ( = 0,  =  max ) in equilibrium. Proposition 4 summarizes the PBE when the two senders are ex ante identical.
When there is prejudice,  = 0, and the equilibrium signaling incentives are
Under full information ( = 1),  * = 12, and the equilibrium incentives are b
Let  *  and  *  be the value of
1. If  *   , and  *   , the unique equilibrium involves full information and no discrimination ( = 1,  * = 12,  =  max ).
If  *
  , and  *   , the unique equilibrium involves prejudice.
From Proposition 4, we can identify the source of prejudice. Prejudice arises in equilibrium when competitive signaling cannot create a sufficiently high signaling value and induce  *    or  *   . Corollary 3 shows when the conditions are likely to be satisfied.
Corollary 3
Other things being equal, prejudice is likely to arise if  or  is low, or
That is,  has a greater incentive to pre-judge senders without sufficient information if the added value of finding another −quality sender is not too high (a low ) or −quality is difficult to distinguish because it is too easy for any sender to signal (a high Φ  ). For the same reason,  is more likely to choose prejudice when  is low. As  declines, signals become less valuable to . This reduces the senders' incentive to signal, b  * or b   2 , which in turn, lowers the value of full information and, thus,  is more likely to choose prejudice.
Policy Implications
In this section, we discuss the implications of the main findings in this paper in the context of affirmative action policies and the No-Child-Left-Behind policy. First, we discuss the implication of Color-Blind affirmative action that bans any race-based choice. Then, we discuss the implication of a purely competition-oriented college admission policy when minorities face a severe disadvantage in signaling and the role of the No-Child-Left-Behind policy in this case.
Color-Blind Affirmative Action
In the context of college admissions, color-sighted affirmative action means that the admissions office is allowed to consider race as a factor when making a decision. In contrast, affirmative action bans, or color-blind affirmative action, in contrast, denies any race-based decision on the basis of a non-discriminatory principle, advocating purely merit-based selection. The system of purely-merit based selection corresponds to the competitive signaling under full information with no comparative discrimination ( = 12) in the current framework. Although there is merit in competitive signaling given the inefficiency in disregarding informative signals under prejudice, our findings concerning optimal comparative discrimination indicate that a purely non-discriminatory policy is not always optimal.
From Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, we find that, if the senders are not ex ante identical, the optimal level of comparative discrimination is to favor a disadvantaged sender. This is because signaling efforts observed from senders facing greater difficulty in signaling indicate a greater probability of high quality. In the context of college admissions, this implies that, if two applicants have equally qualifying credentials, allowing race-based decisions (color-sighted affirmative action) to favor minority indeed can be optimal. 11 In this case, insisting on a purely non-discriminatory policy,  = 12 6 =  * , would lower the value of signals under a competitive signaling system,  *  , which would increase the receiver's incentive to move to a more intensive indexbased decision, prejudice. Thus, such a purely non-discriminatory policy may indeed backfire and promote prejudice.
In this paper, the need for an index-based decision exists even under competitive signaling because both senders may have equally qualifying signals. Similarly, in reality, even under a purely-merit based system, there may be a situation in which the senders are not clearly distinguishable by their signals because the signals are intrinsically imperfect. For example, highly qualified students can obtain a score of 88 and less qualified students can obtain 89 on a test. Because senders' signals may not be perfect in revealing their hidden quality, there is a need for another proxy in decision-making. This paper finds that for that reason, even under a merit-based system, allowing an index-based decision to improve the incentives of a disadvantaged group can indeed improve the soundness of the merit-based system.
As a result of affirmative action bans for higher education, in California, Michigan, and Texas, any race-based decision is now prohibited in the college admission process. There have been some doubts that color-blind affirmative action actually promotes efficiency. Chan and Eyster (2003) and Fryer et al (2008) argue that a color-blind policy can be inefficient because strict enforcement of such a policy is impossible and admissions offices may still use other race-related variables in deciding admissions instead of race. Prior to the ban, although race could be a factor, the schools relied primarily on standardized test scores and GPAs for admission. New admission policies now give more weight to other traits, such as the student's standing in his/her high school as well as leadership and extra-curricular activities. 12 Hence, in practice, color-blind affirmative action may simply replace race with other indices that are closely related to race for admission criteria. The new admission criteria are often viewed as more inefficient than race. This confirms the prediction in this paper that a purely non-discriminatory policy may indeed promote more inefficiency.
The Effectiveness of Competitive Signaling
From the investigation on what promotes the receiver's incentive to discard potentially valuable information, we find that the gist of the question lies in whether a competition-oriented system is efficient. The immediate implication of Proposition 1 and Corollary 3 is that a competitive signaling mechanism may not always be efficient if excessive competition among the senders destroys their signaling incentive. However, Case 2 of Proposition 4 (or (11)) indicates that there is a more serious issue when competitive outcomes are no different than that from prejudice, i.e.,  2 e  2 +  3 is very small. For example, suppose economic hardship significantly limits the possibility of a high quality minority (type 2) to signal, e.g., Ψ 2 ≈ 0, Φ 1  Φ 2 , and even under competitive signaling, at b
Hence, there is no essential difference between prejudice and competitive signaling in the outcomes. In both cases, the signaling effort from a minority is substantially lower than that from a majority. For the minority, there is no incentive to signal under prejudice, and signaling is not affordable under competitive signaling. In this case, there is no real gain from a competitive signaling system. A competitive system is effective if competitive signaling can offer a meaningful difference in signaling incentives for minority senders who would not have the same opportunity under prejudice. This requires that signals are closely correlated with the hidden quality, rather than an irrelevant factor like economic hardship. In an effort to ensure that the signals are free from the influence of other irrelevant factors, the Head Start program or the No-Child-Left-Behind policy can play an important role. As the policies make the signaling environment more homogenous for both races, any observed signaling outcomes would be correlated more with the hidden quality for either race than the economic hardship. Thus, the policies enhance the value of signaling under competition.
Conclusion
This paper models prejudice in a signaling game between a receiver and two senders who differ in one irrelevant, but observable, index. Prejudice occurs when the receiver chooses to (partially) ignore more informative signals from the senders in favor of less informative indices from the senders. In equilibrium, prejudice is likely to arise if competitive signaling is inefficient. Acquiring all of the signaled information under competitive signaling may be too costly for the receiver if competition reduces senders' signaling incentives substantially and worsens the quality of overall signals. In such a case, prejudice removes the impact of competition by pre-screening senders on the basis of their observable index. If signaling does not reveal enough information even under competitive signaling, another index-based decision may be necessary. In such a case, the optimal level of comparative discrimination will favor a disadvantaged sender to minimize prediction errors.
The analysis of policy implications based on these results indicates that colorblind affirmative action is not always optimal and can actually increase the likelihood of prejudice. We point out the importance of the Head Start program and the No Child Left Behind policy in improving the quality of a signal itself. This is because competitive equilibrium may not be effective if the signals are not better proxies for the hidden quality than an index.
Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1
For any given 
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose   0. By construction, in equilibrium, for given  and ,
At min b  2 = 0, b  1  0 is at its maximum, and at max b  2 , b  1  0 is at its minimum. Since Ω  is continuous and monotone decreasing in the element, by Fixed Point Theorem, such a b  *  exists and is unique. The stability condition requires that the slope of the best response function for type 1 to be greater than that for type 2, i.e., 
Proof of Proposition 3
A favorable treatment of type 1 (  =  max ) based on the belief e  1  e  2 (from (9)) actually results in e  1  e  2 because it gives greater incentives for type 1 to signal, i.e., b  1  b  2 . Since e  1 0  0, this confirms e  1  e  2 . Similarly, when   =  min , this confirms e  1  e  2 . If e  1 = e  2 , any  is optimal for . However, since e   0  0, for any
Thus,  * =  max (or  * =  min  respectively) is always a weakly dominant strategy if e  1 ≥ e  2 ( e  1 ≤ e  2 ) is expected.
Proof of Proposition 4
A.  3 ≥ 0. (6), we obtain  3 = 0 since Γ = 0 at  * . Thus, (11) reduces
If
where  =  if  ≤ 1 or (2 − ) if   1. On the other hand,  will not acquire full information ( = 0) in equilibrium if and only if  2 and  3 are small around the equilibrium signaling efforts. Evaluating (11) at  = 0, we obtain
C. When Φ 1 = Φ 2 = Φ (ex ante identical senders)
In this case, any difference in signaling error or signaling value is due to different incentives, b   . Throughout the proof, without loss of generality, we assume that type 1 is the favored type. Then since  =  max is a weakly dominant strategy, other things being equal,  plans to favor type 1 with a  max  probability, if  is ever chosen.
Suppose
(The argument is symmetric for the case when Φ 1  Φ 2 .) From (6),
